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NEED FOR A BALANCED POLICY.
The new opportunities presented by General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev's policies of perestroika ("restructuring) and glasnost'
("openness") for human contacts between American and Soviet
citizens seem quite exciting. TV link-ups, free-wheeling debates at
various fora, forthcoming exchanges between Soviet and American
undergraduate students— all of this appears to be the first step
towards something Americans have desired since World War II: a
greater mutual understanding between the. Soviet and American
peoples, leading to a more peaceful world. There is a pronounced
tendency accross the whole spectrum of political opinion in this
country to see Soviet-American exchanges as unreservedly
beneficial to this nation. But in the real world there is no such thing
as a policy with only benefits and without any costs to it. If our
hopes for Soviet-American exchanges are not to turn into a bitter
disappointment (something that happens all too frequently in Soviet-
American relations) we must come up with a balanced policy in this
matter, which realistically takes into account both pluses and
minuses of US-USSR exchanges.
There is no doubt that reducing the isolation imposed on the Soviet
people by its own regime for the last seventy years generally would
This is prepared text of a testimony presented at the hearings of Commission
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of U.S. Congress on November
17, 1987. Views expressed here are solely those of the author and not
necessarily of the Department of the Navy or any other agency of the U.S.
Government.
serve American national interest. But we should not make a mistake
of assuming that the Soviet regime will not attempt to make wide
use of increased exchanges for its own ends inimical to our national
interest. The basic problem is as follows:
It will take a very long time before the increased exposure
of Soviet citizens to America results in decisive changes in
Soviet political mentality and subsequently in qualitatively
better character of the relations between the two nations.
It will take much less time, however, before the Soviets
can reap benefits from exchanges in the sphere of military
technology and propaganda.
We should recognize that exchanges require wise policy management
and oversight, and that regular involvement of the CSCE in these
matters can significantly contribute to making Soviet-American
exchanges benficial to the our national interest.
UNDERSTANDING THE SOVIETS.
The one clear benefit this nation can derive from exchanges with the
Soviets is our improved understanding of their system of
government and society. To achieve maximum benefits for visiting
Americans, exchange programs should meet the following
requirements:
• American visitors should preferably stay for reasonably long
periods of time in the Soviet Union, from 2 or 4 months to a year.
• American visitors, especially students, should live as their Soviet
counterparts do. The Soviets have succeeded in segregating Western
diplomats and journalists in special compounds in Moscow; they
usually segregate exchange students as well. While it will be difficult
to end isolation of American diplomats and journalists in the
immediate future, the isolation of American students should be
ended as soon as possible.
• Greater geographic dispersion of Americans on exchange visits to
the Soviet Union should be achieved. Now they are all too frequently
concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad. This definitely limits their
perspective on life in the Soviet Union.
I should say very frankly that I am sceptical of short visits to the
Soviet Union so fashionable today 1 When I came to this country as
an immigrant 10 years ago, I had to go through the process of
learning about a different culture, a different society. On the basis of
my own cross-cultural experience, I am confident that had I spent
only several weeks in the United States, I would have understood
very little about this society. Therefore, I am sure that the utility of
short visits to the USSR by multitudes of Americans not speaking
Russian and depending heavily on their official Soviet hosts is only
marginal.
UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICANS.
We should not be, on the basis of experience, too certain about the
positive impact of exposing Soviet visitors to our democratic values.
Several cautionary points should be made to avoid excessive
expectations.
• Historically, penetration of Western ideas and values into the
Russian society was a painful and uneven process. Indeed,
throughout the XVIII, XIX and early XXth century Russia's educated
classes tried to introduce Western ideas and values into their nation's
political life, but with very limited success: the Russian society was
too large (as it is today), the bureaucracy was too entrenched (as it is
today), and the political requirements of keeping a huge
multinational overland empire together were too pressing (as they
are today) for drastic liberalization to occur.
• There is, unfortunately, no established correlation between visiting
a democratic society and becoming a democrat. On the one hand,
Vladimir Lenin, the father of Soviet totalitarian communism, spent
most of his adult life in exile in such democratic nations as Great
Britain and Switzerland. So did a number of other leading early
Soviet communists. On the other hand, Dr. Andrei Sakharov, the most
consistent proponent of democracy in the Soviet Union, has never
been to the West.
1 For a description of this new fashion, see Barbara Gamarekian, "A Hot Ticket
Is Round Trip, to or from Moscow," The New York Times . November 9, 1987.
• We should not assume that spending time as an exchange student
in the United States necessarily makes a Soviet (or, for that matter,
any other foreigner) a friend of the United States. Example: one of
General Secretary Gorbachev's top foreign policy aides, Aleksandr
Yakovlev, a member of the Politburo and a Secretary of the Central
Committee responsible for propaganda, spent a whole year in the late
1950s as one of the first Soviet exchange students at Columbia
University. He also served as a Soviet Ambassador to Canada from
1973 to 1983. Despite his great exposure to the United States as a
student and as a diplomat, he is now one of the most virulently anti-
American writers in the Soviet Union. His recent book, From Truman
to Reagan , suggests that Americans need "a shock of pain, just like
the one in Vietnam ... in order to feel shame and disenchantment
instead of jingoism;" it describes the United States as "a country of
generally poorly informed people indifferent to suffering and
troubles of others," and the American middle class as the "carrier of
nationalist, racist, chauvinistic and militaristic sentiments and
strivings." Yakovlev attributes American signing of SALT I to "the
defeat in Vietnam," and concludes by saying that the American state
is "permeated with chauvinism and messianism." 2 As the official
responsible for the work of Soviet mass media, Mr. Yakovlev has
overseen several viciously anti-American disinformation campaigns,
including the one accusing the United States Government of
manufacturing the AIDS virus, accusing the CIA of organizing the
Jonestown massacre, and charging the United States with importing
babies from the Third World in order to obtain transplant organs
from them.
• The Soviets who come to the United States as newsmen or
exchange visitors in many (if not most) cases report to the Soviet
public a picture of the United States so distorted that it can cause the
Soviet people to hate and dislike America. Vladimir Simonov, the
correspondent of the Novosti Press Agency and of the Literaturnaya
Gazeta in the United States, compared the recent resurgence of
patriotism in American to an "epyleptic fit." 3 A member of a recent
delegation of young Soviet political leaders to the United States, upon
his return informed the Soviet public that President Reagan allegedly
2 A.N. Yakovlev, Ot Trumena do Reygana (Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 1984) pp.
12, 34, 155, 398.
3 Vladimir Simonov, "Yablochnyy pirog bez yablok," Literaturnaya Gazeta .
October 16, 1985.
welcomed AIDS as the means to "destroy the scum of the society and
to strengthen the family," and that Gorbachev was more popular in
the US than Reagan.4
"to'
• Studying American society at first hand does not necessarily bring
the Soviets to conclusions conducive to peaceful relations between
both nations. Thus, a noted Soviet student of American public opinion
Yuri Zamoshkin from the Institute of USA and Canada, came to
believe that the best way for the Soviets to deal with the United
States is by keeping American people vulnerable to nuclear threat:
The "factor of fear" of the threat of nuclear war and of the
American vulnerability in such a war can apparently stimulate
the anti-militarist mood of the Americans, their striving for
peaceful agreements and normalization of relations with the
USSR only under certain conditions. One of such conditions is
destruction of the illusion that the USA can reach such a level
of development of nuclear strength and ballistic missile
defense that would reduce the risk of nuclear war or save
Americans in case of war.5
• Even if the stream of Soviet visitors to the United States increases
tenfold, the Soviet government will retain an ability to select such
visitors from the ranks of the privileged, and use such visits as a
reward for political loyalty. Thus, increased chances of visiting the
United States might induce more Soviets to act as political
conformists. Soviet-American exchanges will begin to have a
genuinely positive impact on the relations between the two nations
only when controls on travel of Soviet citizens to the West, including
the United States, are greatly relaxed to conform with the norms
accepted in most of the world, and when Soviet citizens can have a
real say in their nation's political system.
4 Literaturnava Gazeta . September 9, 1987.
5 Yu. Zamoshkin, "Yademaya opasnost' i faktor strakha," SShA. Ekonomika.
Politika. Ideologiva. 1985, No.3, p.7.
AVOIDING PITFALLS.
If Soviet-American exchanges are to further the national interest of
the United States, two types of pitfalls should be avoided. One is that
the Soviets will use their access to American scientific and research
and development community to increase their military strength. The
other one is that the Soviets will use exchanges for legitimizing their
violations of human rights.
THE ISSUE OF SCIENTIFIC CONTACTS.
The possiblity that Soviet arsenal will not keep pace with the latest
developments of world science and technology is haunting the Soviet
leaders. Gorbachev's policy of perestroyka (restructuring) is
frequently rationalized by the Soviets themselves as the means for
further improving their defense technologies. The problems of
access to Western science and technology stand foremost among the
Soviet concerns. Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov expressed concern
that the correlation of military strength between East and West will
shift against the Soviet Union if the latter is "isolated" from "modern
technologies." 6
In the 1970s, with the excitement over Soviet-American exchanges
in the air, the security aspect of scientific exchanges was all too
frequently overlooked. As a result, according to the Department of
Defense, Soviet scientists used their exchange visits to American
research centers to obtain information on such militarily significant
projects as fuel-air explosive devices, "wing-in-ground effect"
aerodynamic vehicles, and heads-up displays. 7 They worked on
communications problems at the Operations Research Center at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); on computers at the
Operations Research Center at Berkeley, the Digital Systems
Laboratory at Stanford, and Computer Science Department at UCLA;
on ceramic materials (crucial for space technology) at the Department
of Material Science and Engineering at MIT; on aircraft gas turbine
engines at the Department of Aeronautical Science and Mechanical
6 "Kursom nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa," Izvestiya . December 18, 1985.
7 The Honorable Frank Carclucci, "A Letter to Dr. William D. Carey," Science .
January 8, 1982, pp. 140-141. Fuel-air explosive munitions are based on a
principle of creating an aerosol cloud of fuel-air mixture which is then
detonated to achieve an explosive effect. A "wing-in-ground effect"
aerodynamic vehicle is an extremely low flying aircraft; heads-up displays are
used to project flight data on aircraft cockpit glass.
Engineering at Northwestern University and at the Department of
Aerospace Engineering at Georgia Institute of Technology; on space
technology at the Department of Aeronautics at MIT, and so on and
so forth. 8
Even a cursory look at the institutional affiliation of Soviet
participants in only one exchange program (International Research
and Exchanges Board, established in 1968 by the American Council of
Learned Societies) shows that many Soviet participants were drawn
from some of the most famous institutions for training military
research and development specialists and conducting their own
research and development programs for the military. Thus, the
Moscow Institute of Engineering Physics dispatched eleven scientists
to study in the U.S.; Moscow Advanced Technical School named after
Bauman (the alma mater of Andrei Tupolev, the famous aircraft
designer, and of Sergei Korolev, the father of the first Soviet ICBM),
four; the Moscow Aviation Institute sent four; Moscow Institute of
Steel and Alloys, three; Moscow Physical and Technical Institute,
two; Moscow Institute of Electronic Technology, two; Kuibyshev
Aviation Institute, three; Leningrad Aircraft Instrumentation
Institute, two; Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute, two; and Leningrad
Polytechnical Institute, three. (I should note that it was not the job of
IREX to screen the Soviet exchange candidates, but of the U.S.
Government, which apparently failed to do so.)
The situation has obviously improved since the beginning of 1980s,
as a result of greater concern about Soviet illegal transfers of
militarily significant Western technologies, as well as of the reduced
flow of exchanges in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Now, with the number of Soviet exchange scientists
obviously increasing, it is important to exercise caution and
discretion when deciding on which Soviet scientist is to be admitted
where.
It is often argued that the mere presence of Soviet
scientists at American research centers tells them nothing
they could not learn by reading American scientific
8 International Research and Exchanges Board. Annual Report 1977-78 (New
York: IREX, 1979), pp.48-51; International Research and Exchanges Board.
Annual Report 1979-80 (New York: IREX, 1981), pp.45-46; International
Research and Exchanges Board. Annual Report 1980-81 (New York: IREX, 1982),
pp. 44-46.
literature. This is only partially true. This argument
overlooks the fact, emphasized in a recent study of Soviet
science by the Rand Corporation, that the critical
information for linking theoretical knowledge to mass
production is know-how, which is something the Soviets
cannot find in journals. Obtaining know-how "requires
personal contact... This applies to the transfer not only of
know-how concerning a device or process, but also to
purely theoretical information." In addition, because of the
Russian tradition of relying on Western science and
technology, information about Western developments
serves as a catalyst for the Soviet decision-making in
science and R&D, helping overcome bureaucratic inertia. 9
The Soviets in fact have an established tradition of Western training
for future leaders of their military research and development. The
"father" of the first Soviet ICBMs, Sergei Korolev, had been an
apprentice of a French aircraft designer, Paul Richard. So were Chief
Designer of helicopters N.Kamov, Chief Designer of flying boats G.
Beriev, and one of the two Chief Designers of MIG aircraft, M.
Gurevich. The man who designed the gun for the famous T-34 tank
of World War II, Vasily Grabin, had been trained by German artillery
engineers, while the Chief Designer of magnetrons (powerful vacuum
tubes) for Soviet radars, Anatoliy Fedoseev, had been a trainee at
RCA in the United States. While the Soviets are much more
technologically advanced now that fifty, or forty, or even twenty
years ago, they still look to the West when major changes in science
and technology are on the horizon.
Indeed, Soviet military leaders believe that today military affairs
are undergoing a profound revolution due to the fast pace of
technolgical development, on the scale of the one which took place
after World War II with the introduction of nuclear weapons,
electronics, and missile technology. Soviet authoritative sources, such
as Major General M. Yasyukov, a professor at the Voroshilov
Academy of the Soviet General Staff, emphasize the fact that it is
becoming increasingly difficult to draw the line between
what in modern science is important for military R&D and
what is not:
9 Arthur Alexander, Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition (Santa Monica,
CA: Rand Corp., 1982), pp.37-39.
8
...the leading directions of scientific-technological progress—
the robotics, computer technology, instrument making,
and electronics—are at the same time the basic catalyst of
military-technical progress. 10
The resulting problem for Soviet-American scientific
exchanges is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to
judge whether granting access to a research facility in this
country to a Soviet scientist will result in enhancing Soviet
military technology or not.
Forthcoming exchanges of undergraduate students is the latest step
in enhanced Soviet-American human contacts. While exposing young
Soviets to the American university life is certainly a good idea, it
does not remove the security issue from the agenda because of the
differences in Soviet and American systems of higher education, and
because of the differences between Soviet and American young
people.
• A Soviet undergraduate is pursuing a strictly professional
training to a much greater degree than his/her American
counterpart, and has little hope or need of ever going to graduate
school or of changing the profession he/she has acquired in college.
Thus, a twenty-year old student from the Moscow Institute of
Electronic Technology spends a year in an American university,
graduates from his own college in a couple of years, and at the age of
24 is professionally employed as an electronics engineer in Soviet
research and development community. It is noteworthy that the first
group of Soviet undergraduates to study in the U.S. consists only of
science students: five will go to Yale to study chemistry, and five to
the University of Maryland to study physics. 11
• Most of male students have done their two years of military duty,
which, combined with the general thrust of Soviet upbringing, makes
them much more disciplined and respectful of authority than
their American counterparts. Thus, they are reasonably likely at
least to pursue scientific studies which the Soviet government wants
them to pursue (rather than take un-Marxist courses in politics and
10 Major General M. Yasyukov, "Military Policies of the CPSU: Essence,
Content," Kommunist Vooruzhennvkh Sil . 1985, No. 20, p. 20.
11 Fred M. Hechinger, "U.S.-Soviet Unsung Gains," The New York Times .
November 3, 1987.
history), and not to divulge to Americans around them any secrets
they have been entrusted with.
• In addition, most of the Soviet male undergraduate students are
enrolled in compulsory commissioned reserve officer
training system, which translates, as far as possible, their
professional education into a military speciality. 12 I happen to think
that it is important to bring Soviet undergraduates to the United
States, but it is also legitimate to remember that we are educating
Soviet reserve officers at American schools.
LEGITIMIZING SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.
The Soviets are dissatisfied with geopolitical equality with the United
States; they strive to be recognized as a moral equal of this nation. To
this end, they rely heavily on concluding exchange agreements
between bogus "public organizations" in the Soviet Union (even the
Soviet press is now acknowledging that "voluntary assocations" in the
Soviet Union, numbering thousands of members, exist only on paper
and are a form of "spiritual cheating") 13 and real public voluntary
organizations in the U.S. Sometimes, such exchanges are used by the
Soviets to give respectability to their institutions and personalities
involved in violations of human rights.
The most notorious example of the latter kind has been the exchange
agreement, signed in 1985, between the American Bar
Association (ABA) and the Association of Soviet Lawyers
(ASL). The ASL is not a working organization of Soviet lawyers but
rather a special body established in order to conduct propaganda
against human rights activists and Jewish refuseniks at home and
whitewash Soviet violations of human rights in the West. According
to Dina Kaminskaya, a former prominent Soviet defense attorney
forced into exile because of her courageous defense of human rights
activists, only the most "politically reliable" lawyers were invited to
join the ASL.
12 See Mikhail Tsypkin, Soviet Reserve Officer Training System: An
Assessment (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Department of National
Security Affairs, 1984).
13 Aleksandr Vasinskiy, "Neither for Ourselves, Nor for Our Descendants,"
Izvestiva. July 29, 1986.
10
In 1979, the ASL published an anti-Semitic and anti-American White
Book , portraying Soviet Jewish would-be emigres as inspired by
Western "intelligence services," and American newsmen in Moscow
as "CIA agents." In 1985, just at the time the ABA was signing its
exchange agreement with the ASL, the latter published the second
edition of the White Book . In it, the President of ASL Aleksandr
Sukharev and Soviet Army General David Dragunskiy (who presides
over the Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee, a quasi-official body
dedicated to struggle with Jewish emigration and cultural movement)
praised the 1975 UN resolution equating Zionism with racism.
Further, the White Book attacks religious education of Jewish
children as "nationalistic," and describes the United States as a
land of government-sponsored anti-Semitism. 14
The Vice-President of ASL, Samuil Zivs (who is also the Vice-
President of the Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee) described the illegal
exile of Dr. Andrei Sakharov to Gorky as "in full conformity with ...
legal norms," although Sakharov was never charged with any crime,
never faced a court of law, and was never given a chance to defend
himself. Zivs described Jewish activists Anatoly Shcharansky as a
paid agent of the CIA, and accused Dr. Anatoly Koryagin, a
courageous critic of Soviet abuses of psychiatry, of terrorist activity!
Zivs also attacked Amnesty International for "poisoning people's
minds with the disinformation about the Soviet Union." 15
The President of ASL, Aleksandr Sukharev, is the Minister of Justice
of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) in the Soviet Union, and thus is
directly responsible for violations of human rights and persecution of
dissidents. Recently, Sukharev was criticized in the Soviet press for
his indifference to violations of elementary legal norms (the right of
a journalist to take notes during a court session violated by a
judge.) 16
The decision of ABA to treat Sukharev, Zivs and ASL in a collegial
fashion has caused a barrage of criticism in this country. To diffuse
this criticism, the ABA insists that the exchange agreement with ASL
provides the American lawyers with a valuable opportunity to press
14 Belaya kniga (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1979), pp. 172-230, passim;
Belaya kniga (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1985) pp.10, 13, 58-60, 90,
249-251.
1' Samuil Zivs, The Anatomy of Lies (Moscow: Progress, 1984), pp.103, 46, 154.
16
"V pol'zu spravedlivosti," Literaturnaya gazeta . September 24, 1986.
11
vigorously behind the scenes for improvement in human rights
practices of the Soviets. An excellent illustration of feebleness of this
pressure is contained in a memorandum from the ABA on a meeting
between its delegation and the Soviet Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet Andrei Gromyko on July 2, 1986. In the course of the meeting,
the only statement regarding human rights made on behalf of
ABA by then President William F. Falsgraf was as follows:
President Falsgraf ... advised President Gromyko that Jewish
groups in the United States and Jewish members of the
American Bar Assocation are concerned about U.S.S.R.'s policy
with respect to emigration to Israel. Again President Falsgraf
pointed out that this is a minority view but a minority view
held with great sincerity. (Emphasis mine-M.Ts.)
(The whole text of this memorandum can be found in the Appendix .)
Thus, the leaders of the American Bar Association had nothing more
to tell the Soviets about human rights than that it is a matter of one
group of Jews concerned about another group of Jews! The lesson of
ABA-ASL exchanges is that once an American public organization
commits itself to exchanges with a bogus Soviet organization, without
much preliminary research into the background of the latter, and
without much understanding of the nature of the Soviet political
system and society, it is bound to be embarassed, then defend itself
by claims of exaggerated achievements in their dealings with the
Soviets, and stick to the agreement no matter what so as to avoid
recognizing a mistake. The American public is mislead (because of
the ABA's enormous prestige), while conduct by ABA leaders, such as
the one exhibited at the meeting with Mr. Gromyko, can earn us only
contempt from the Soviets.
A related point is that there is no clearing house of solid
background information on Soviet organizations and
individuals to which anybody who wants to initiate an exchange
program can turn. It is very easy to propose another Soviet-
American exchange program which looks fine at first glance but
contains a potential for embarassment. For instance, Senator Paul
Simon praised the idea of establishing "sister university" programs
between American and Soviet universities, including Moscow State
University. But Moscow University, like other Soviet schools, is the
opposite of the American idea of free academic inquiry; in addition,
the Admissions Board of Moscow State University practices racial
12
discrimination against Jews, as documented by the Moscow
Helsinki Monitors group, even going as far as demanding a
genealogical tree from an applicant to prove absence of "Jewish
blood!" 17
Perhaps it will be an appropriate role for the CSCE, with its
tradition of multifaceted involvement in the issues of East-
West contacts, and with the staff unparalleled on the
Capitol Hill for expertise in Soviet affairs, to establish a
clearing house of information on Soviet institutions and
personalities helpful to those interested in Soviet-American
exchanges.
CONCLUSIONS.
Increased Soviet-American exchanges can serve our national interest
provided that a balanced policy on exchanges is exercised by the
Federal Government, that this policy is a beneficiary of serious
interest from the U.S. Congress, especially from the CSCE, and that
public groups involved in Soviet-American exchanges establish
cooperative relationship with both the Administration and the
Congress.
Some specific policy recommendations:
• The CSCE should make hearings on Soviet-American exchanges a
regular part of its work.
• The CSCE should request reports on the status of Soviet-American
exchanges both from the Interagency Coordinating Committee on
U.S. -Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA), which oversees all U.S. Government
activities with respect of the Soviet Union, and from the Committee
on Exchanges (COMEX) of the Technology Transfer Intelligence
Committee (TTIC), which deals with the security aspects of Soviet-
American exchanges. 18
17 Senator Paul Simon, An Agenda for U.S. -Soviet Exchanges (Senate Chamber:
May 21, 1986), p. 3; "Discrimination against Jews Enrolling at Moscow
University, 1979," Arkhiv Samizdata. No.4695, pp. 1-3.
18 For details of U.S. Government decision-making process on the matters of
U.S. -Soviet exchanges, see John D. Negroponte, "U.S. -Soviet Scientific
Exchanges," Current Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau
of Public Affairs), No.997, p.3.
13
• The CSCE should invite representatives of the public, involved in
Soviet-American exchanges and in monitoring the human rights
situation in the Soviet Union, to testify about exchange programs and
their impact on human rights.
• The CSCE should establish a clearing house of information on Soviet
institutions and personalities useful for those initiating new exchange
programs with the Soviets.*
Much of my research on U.S. -Soviet exchanges was done while I was the
Salvatori Fellow in Soviet Studies at The Heritage Foundation, to which I
express deep gratitude. My special thanks are to Burt Pines, Heritage's Senior
Vice President for Research, and W. Bruce Weinrod, Director of Defense and
Foreign Policy Studies. Needless to say, all the views expressed above are solely
mine. I have also drawn quite heavily on my materials previously published in
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On Tuesday morning at 10:00 a.m., the American Bar Association
delegation consisting of President and Mrs. William W. Falsgraf,
Eugene C. Thomas, Allen E. Brennecke, Weymen I. Lundquist, Thomas H.
Gonser and David J. A. Hayes, Jr. met in the Catherine Hall of the
Kremlin Palace with President Andrei A. Gromyko and four of his
aides. We were accompanied by President Alexander Y. Sukharev of
the ASL and by Vasilay A. Valsihin who acted as an interpreter.
President Gromyko welcomed the group to the USSR and specifically to
the Kremlin Palace. President Gromyko then called upon President
Falsgraf. President Falsgraf then developed three themes namely:
1) our perception of the lack of independence of the lawyer in the
USSR, 2) our extreme concern about human rights throughout the
world, 3) and the future of Soviet/American relations.
First, said President Falsgraf most of the lawyers of the American
Bar Association favored a relationship with the Association of
Soviet Lawyers and favored the exchange of delegations. American
JLawyers , however, do not understand how Soviet lawyers practice law
/'and assume that there is a lack of independence on the part of the
Soviet lawyer. Many in the USA feel that in the representation of
clients the first duty of the attorney in the USSR is to the state












Falsgraf then moved on to his second point and advised
Gromyko that Jewish groups in the United States and Jewish
the American Bar Association are concerned about
policy with respect to emigration to Israel. Again,
Falsgraf pointed out that this is a minority vi gw but a
iew that is held with great sinceriTTyT We all recall, he
Che suffering of the Jewish people in Europe in World War
is important that they have a homeland and a sanctuary as





With respect to Soviet-American relations, President Falsgraf
commented that as a personal view he thought that the relationship
between the USA and the USSR is now at its best level in his
lifetime. He commented that President Gromyko would certainly
remember when it was not as good as it is today and that both side
should take every opportunity to promote better relations between
the two nations.
President Gromyko responded, handling the Jewish emigration issue
very carefully. He commented first that it was useful to explore
this issue, yet once again, and stated with considerable
forcefulness that a ll nationa l groups have equal rights in the USS1
and a ll citizens have equal rights and responsibilities . HIE
suggested tnat misl eading editor ials in the Western and particular
in the United States media have created a misunderstanding that thi
American Jewish groups have with respect to Soviet policy.
President Gromyko noted that the policy of the Tsars has long been
repudiated by the USSR in fact, the Anti-Jewish Policies of the
Tsars led in part to the Revolution in 1917. In the 1970s he
continued, massive numbers of Jews left the Soviet Union to be
reunited with their families in Israel, Western Europe or the Unit<
States. They are always reprimanded these days for not letting
these emigrants go but such is not the fact. President Gromyko sai
that they look at every application as a single case and make
judgements based on this single case.
President Gromyko then advised the delegation that there were
limitations of this emigration policy that related to national
security questions. Uo emigration permits can be issued for a
specific period of time to a person that has worked in a national
security industry; when that person took the position he signed a
permit which indicated he would not seek emigration for a specified
amount of time. He confided though that there were very few of
these cases. He stated that there were many Jewish people who
simply do not want to leave the Soviet Union yet they are on lists
held by various American groups. President Gromyko said it was not
their policy purpose to stop the flow of Jewish emigrants to
Israel
.
There is a problem said President Gromyko that many of the emigrant
who have left to go to Israel and Western Europe want to return to
the Soviet Union. The Soviets do process these applications to coo
back though they really don't want these people back because most o





Many Soviets believe than many of the prospective Jewish emigrants
are strongly pro-Israel and hence are opposed to Soviet policy in
the Middle East. Soviets treat these persons with deep suspicion.
The Soviets are concerned about Israel's posture with the Syrians
and with the Palestinans and although they do not officially condemn
Israel for its policies, they are not policies that promote world
peace. President Gromyko then concluded his discussion of Jewish
emigration stating that he would have brought up the subject if
President Falsgraf had not brought it up.
<*
Then President Gromyko commented that political stability is
terribly important. The whole world counts on the relationship of
"
Htc^JJSA and USSR returning . rn whar -f f was during Wr>r iH Uar TT. Th*
present relationships between our two countries are not what we
would like', there is too much tension present. The hope of Geneva ^&£"
f^rmrjniiAg an d we hope that there , will ^ nn «ar flnrf npirhp-r nacinn 1
can have military surpt-i nn' ry oyer the oth^r^- It seems to be, said
Tresident Gromyko, that the practical actions of the United States
government have not been in accordance recently with the spirit of
Geneva. More and more nuclear arms are being made by the United
States and outer space will soon be overburdened with nuclear
weapons. The Soviets are very much opposed to nuclear weapons in
outer space and have proposed many times that there be no nuclear
arms in space. We both also need to reduce nuclear warheads and we
have recently proposed that to President Reagan.
We must reduce arms, continued President Gromyko; if the arms race
does not 'stop, something awful will most certainly happen. Their
recent experience at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant shows how
dangerous nuclear weapons can be. Nuclear power must at all times
be used for peace.
President Gromyko then commented that trade and cultural visits such
as the ABA visits to the Soviet Union are very important and it is
an excellent working proposition to have people-to-people contact.
President-Elect Eugene C. Thomas then commented that the USA and the
USSR are two great countries, especially over the last forty years.
This greatness suggested comes from achievement not from just size.
The great powers that won the war must win the peace and above all





Mr. Thomas stated that his point dealt with the role of the lawyer
in the USSR and USA. Lawyers represent their clients as well as t
public interest, and making the law work for the accomplishment of
public policy is very important. Lawyers common concerns are peop
and the public interest. Lawyers are expert in making the law wor
to its public policy ends. The hope of our exchange was that it
might bring lawyers of our two countries together in a search for
peace and prosperity. Terrorism and environmental problems
resolving from nuclear accidents, immigration, all of these make
news stories, but these problems also lend themselves to study by
legal scholars that all might benefit. We can exchange and develo]
dialogue about these legal problems. These types of pursuits can
develop a more positive attitude toward lawyers in each country an<
help to prevent fear and mistrust. Power stems from our American
people. The flow of public opinion to the law will greatly aid al
of us. •
President Gromyko complimented President-Elect Thomas on his
comments and stated our first client is justice in the law. The
ABA, President Gromyko said, can help to influence American policy
makers-only granite would not hear the ABA. Regrettably, he said,
President Reagan's ideas are not in conformity with peace and
control of nuclear weapons. The cemetery—quietness is noc what the
Srvuipt.q want, ^har—rh^y—'K^flnr is no barriers between purely lega
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